# A survey on port financing and charging systems in Europe

Case-studies on port development projects

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Michaël Dooms Michael.Dooms@vub.ac.be


#### Agenda

- Background;
- Types of public intervention in seaports;
- Types of public financing in seaports;
- Is public intervention in seaports justified?;
- Case-study;
- Conclusions of former research and EC literature;
- Policy implications;
- Objectives and set-up of the current study;
- Interim conclusions;
- Case-studies on project financing;
- Conclusions and issues for discussion.

#### Background

- In general, the development of the port sector in the EU depends in a large measure on public sector intervention:
  - Public control on/of the port's management;
  - Financial support mechanisms (subsidies/charging practices).
- General concern of the EC: the competitiveness of the ports in the trans-european transport networks (TEN-T):
  - Do financial relations between the ports and the public sector under the form of public financing influence the competitiveness of the port system as a whole, as well as the competition between ports?
  - Need for a level playing field among ports, given divergent charging practices.
- Recovery of infrastructure costs: the 'user pays' principle.

#### Types of public intervention in seaports



## Types of public financing

FINANCING AUTHORITY	National Government	Regional Government	Local Government	Other
RELEVANT CATEGORIES				
Access Infrastructures  access channels (including disposal of dredging material) navigation aids turning basins breakwaters roads accessing the ports and in the ports but outside terminals rails accessing the port and in the ports but outside terminals inland waterways				
Terminal-related infrastructures				
quays / docks jetties stacking yards land reclamation				
Suprastructures				
roads and rail at the terminal terminal paving / surface finishing port / office buildings warehouses cranes mobile equipment  Operational Management only direct subsidies	000000		00000	
Legal Provisions				

#### Is public intervention in seaports justified?

- Large differences among member states in terms of public investment volumes in the seaport sector:
  - EC has a perception of distorted competition;
  - No formal notification obligation for member states, but information on the past five years needs to be accessible by the EC if an audit appears necessary.
- Based on existing EC documents and legislation:
  - Given the diversity and complexity of the seaport sector, a case-by-case application of the criteria of art. 87 of the Treaty is adopted:
    - Is the infrastructure investment built using public funding?
    - Does the infrastructure investment lead to market distortions?
    - Does the infrastructure investment favour one firm or a selective group of firms?
    - Does the infrastructure investment influence trade patterns between member states?

#### Case study: the Flemish seaports

- Notification of amounts (2001-2004) for:
  - Maintenance and exploitation of maritime access routes;
  - Maintenance and exploitation of the sealocks;
  - Project related infrastructure (docks, quays);
  - Maintenance of berths along the maritime access routes.
- EC has accepted the notification.
- Element of non-discriminatory access for all users seems important (multi-user principle).
- Limited intervention in project related infrastructure in order to increase the financial responsibility of port authorities.

# Main conclusions of former research (e.g. ATENCO) and EC documents (1)

- Different price elasticity of commodities: general cargo, containers and ro-ro very elastic, liquid and dry bulk relatively inelastic to changes in prices;
- Public financing of ports plays an important role;
- Wide diversity of charging systems in ports;
- Difficulties to obtain reliable data on financial flows, lack of transparency of port accounting systems;
- Very high sector complexity (port ownership, port objectives, port autonomy, scope of port activities);
- The EC has more problems with the non-recovery of costs than with the occurrence of public intervention itself.

# Main conclusions of former research (e.g. ATENCO) and EC documents (2)

- Existence of 'hidden' or 'subtle' public support, often linked to the 'administrative heritage' of the past.
- It is impossible to fully compare seaports to other, more conventional transport modes (road, rail).
- Growing agreement among port authorities and port users on transparency of accounts and accounting systems.
- Growing agreement among port authorities on the principle of full cost recovery for operational activities for which the port authority is autonomous and solely responsible.

#### Policy implications (1)

- Due to the lack of transparency and the high sectoral complexity, it is very difficult for the EC to design a regulatory framework for the seaport sector:
  - Risk of ineffective and/or inappropriate measures, e.g. the implementation of uniform charging practices;
  - Risk of adopting ineffective principles, e.g. marginal cost pricing.
- As a result, national and regional governments, as well as port authorities, need to closely follow-up new EC initiatives to avoid ineffective and inappropriate regulation.

#### Policy implications (2)

- The improved transparency of charging practices and accounting systems should ameliorate the sometimes tense relationship between the seaport sector and the EC, especially given that:
  - EU-ports are very efficient in comparison with other world regions;
  - A growing number of EU-ports already applies full cost recovery for activities which fall under its responsibilities.
- The EC has recently commissioned a study on the public financing of seaports.

### Objectives and set-up of the study (1)

#### Objective:

- Enhance transparency with regard to the financial flows between the public purse and the port sector;
- Supplement the existing information base through the analysis of different information sources with regard to port financing and charging.

#### Scope:

- 20 Member states which have seaports on their territory.
- Set-up:
  - Country clusters;
  - Sample of 30 seaports.

### Objectives and set-up of the study (2)

#### **Country Cluster A**

- 1. Denmark
- 2. Finland
- 3. Germany
- 4. Poland

CCL: ISL

#### **Country Cluster C**

11. Greece

CCL: ADK

CCL: VUB

#### **Country Cluster D**

12. Belgium13. France

#### Country Cluster F

- 16. Malta
- 17. Italy
- 18. Slovenia

CCL: Marconsult

#### **Country Cluster B**

- 5. Estonia
- 6. Latvia
- 7. Lithuania
- 8. Netherlands
- 9. Sweden
- 10. Cyprus

CCL: Erasmus

#### Country Cluster E

14. United Kingdom

15. Ireland

CCL: TRI

#### **Country Cluster G**

19. Spain

20. Portugal

CCL: CEGE

## Objectives and set-up of the study (3)

	Selection of Ports	
Antwerpen B	Aarhus DK	Rotterdam NL
Le Havre	Bremen Ports	Lisbon
Marseilles	Hamburg	Setubal
F	FRG	PT
Algeciras Bilbao Barcelona E	Gioa Tauro Genua Trieste	Southampton London Liverpool Immingham Felixstowe
Gothenburg S		UK
Riga	Tallin	Klaipeda
LATVIA	ESTONIA	LITHUANIA
Gdansk	Pireus	Koper
PL	GR	SLOVENIA
Dublin	Marsaxlokk	Helsinki
IRE	MALTA	FI

#### Interim conclusion (1)

- The paradox of EU port policy: many initiatives are undertaken and financed in order to promote environment friendly transport (intermodality, short-sea shipping, inland navigation, rail), but the seaport sector is considered inefficient and a source of market distortions, though seaports are the key driving force, as nodal points, of European intermodal network expansion.
- An ideological shift in the debate is necessary: seaports as driving forces for sustainable development, both on the socioeconomic level and the ecological level.
- The community of port stakeholders (port authorities, port users, port workers) needs to align its objectives and avoid negative, public comments on (alleged) port inefficiencies. Such goal alignment is critical to avoid ineffective and unwanted EC intervention.

#### Interim conclusion (2)

- If the community of stakeholders can agree that cost recovery should be a key guiding principle in port investment and operations, the need and pressure for EC intervention will diminish, subject to the following conditions:
  - A sufficient degree of harmonization of port statistics and port cost categories;
  - More standardized port accounting systems (e.g. Activity Based Costing);
  - Greater transparency of financial flows to/from the port authority.
- The study in progress on public financing provides the community of port stakeholders with a window of opportunity to show that the conditions of a level playing field are fulfilled by providing full access to the relevant information and exhibiting a positive attitude vis-à-vis EC information requests (e.g. the Flemish seaports).

#### Case-studies (1)

- Project-related funding is the most important financial flow to port authorities (compared to the amounts for exploitation and maintenance expenses).
- Based on factual information on recent and planned port development projects in Belgium, France and Germany.
- Four projects:
  - Deurganckdok (Antwerp);
  - Port 2000 (Le Havre);
  - FOS 2XL (Marseilles);
  - Jade Weser Port (Bremen Wilhelmshaven).

#### Case studies (2)

- Comparison of financing structures.
- Sources:
  - Port authorities' data;
  - Feasibility studies;
  - Press;
  - Official reports (e.g. Court of Auditors).

#### Deurganckdok (1)

- Decision to build: 1998.
- Construction of a new tidal dock with approx. 5000m of quay length, 270 ha, capacity approx. 6,5 million TEU (OSC, 2003).
- Financing parties from the public sector:
  - Flemish Region;
  - Port Authority;
  - NMBS/SNCB (rail operator and infrastructure manager).
- Public sector responsible for:
  - Construction of quays, including dredging works;
  - Construction of hinterland connections (road, rail).





### Deurganckdok (2)

 Legal framework for financing by the Flemish Region:

Table 8: Comparison of the old and new financing regimes

	quays	dredging for construction
Financing regime	60%	100%
10/11/1993		
Financing regime	30% (20% from 1/1/2004)	50%
13/07/2001		
Transitional regime for	60% (Provided a detailed	100% (Provided a detailed
specific* projects until	phasing and fixed maximum	phasing and fixed maximum
31/12/2004	amounts)	amounts)
specific* projects until	phasing and fixed maximum	phasing and fixed maximum

Source: Report of the Belgian Court of Auditors to the Flemish Parliament (2005)

## Deurganckdok (3)

Table 7: Overview of the invested amounts in the Deurganckdok project by the Flemish public sector

Type of cost	Total	Flemish	%	Others	%
		Region			
Pre-studies	2.327.526,62	1.928.185,37	83%	399.341,25	17%
Additional	1.518.036,69	637.191,36	42%	880.845,33	58%
Studies					
Quays	247.972.313,10	147.956.670,13	60%	100.015.641,97	40%
Claims	28.212.482,57	16.587.495,95	60%	11.624.986,62	40%
Dredging	174.238.364,38	174.238.364,38	100%	0	0%
Other works	20.606.229,84	17.493.185,78	85%	3.113.044,06	15%
Roads	34.637.085,95	24.263.852,04	70%	10.373.233,91	30%
Expropriation	14.849.252,65	14.849.252,65	100%	0	0%
Social	45.855.415,28	41.740.480,28	91%	4.114.935,00	9%
Guidance Plan					
Nature	24.099.379,54	15.374.650,14	64%	8.724.729,40	36%
compensations					
Total	594.316.085,62	455.069.328,08	77%	139.246.757,54	23%

Source: Report of the Belgian Court of Auditors to the Flemish Parliament (2005)

### Deurganckdok (4)

• Division between private and public sector:

Financing party	Amount (mio €)	%
Flemish Region	460	28,5%
Others (incl. PA)	220	13,5%
Total public	680	42%
P&O Ports	530	33%
PSA	400	25%
Total private	930	58%
General total	1.610	100%

#### Deurganckdok (5)

- Simulation under new financing regime:
  - Ceteris paribus, the distribution of 77 (region)/23 (port authority) would be changed to 55 (port authority) / 45 (region).
- Simulation without financing for quays and dredging (cfr. press statements of government officials):
  - Ceteris paribus, the distribution would be reversed to 77
     (port authority) / 23 (region).
- The new financing regime substantially increases the financial accountability of the port authority.

#### Port 2000 (1)

- Extension of port facilities for container traffic in the Port of Le Havre;
- Construction of a second port entrance, incl. dredging, construction of breakwaters, etc..
- Construction of 4200m of quays (1st phase 1602m 6 berths).
- Capacity estimated at 3-4 million TEU/year.
- Construction of hinterland connections (road, rail).





#### Port 2000 (2)

- Financing structures constructed on a case-by-case basis:
  - The Port Authority submits a proposal to the State, after which negotiations start on project financing.
- Financing parties from the public sector:
  - European Commission (TEN-T, ERDF);
  - State (French Government);
  - Region and Department;
  - Port Authority;
  - French railway infrastructure manager (RFF).

#### Port 2000 (3)

Table 7: Finance structure of the Port 2000 project (in million euros) (italic = public finance)

Financing	Maritime	Environment	Hinterland	Superstructures	Total
party	access / port		access		
	infrastructure				
TEN (EU)	2,50		2,21		4,71
ERDF (EU)	33,10	5,00	4,02		42,12
Region	19,44	9,91	23,20		52,55
Department	19,44	9,91	20,20		49,55
RFF-			13,70		13,70
SNCF*					
State	160	,10	37,82		197,20
Port	433	,60			433,60
Authority					
Operators				275,00	275,00
Sub-total	647,27	45,73	101,15	275,00	1069,15
Total	693	,00	101,15**	275,00	1069,15

<sup>\*</sup> RFF = Réseau Ferré de France: French rail infrastructure manager. SNCF = French national railway operator

Source: internal documents provided by the Port Authority

<sup>\*\*</sup> Of which rail takes 92 million euros, roads 9,15 million euros.

# Port 2000 (4)

Financing party	Amount (mio €)	%	%
EC	46,83	4,4%	
Region/Department	102,1	9,5%	45%
RFF / SNCF	13,7	1,3%	
State	197,20	18,5%	
Port Authority	433,6	40,6%	55%
Total public	794,15	74%	100%
Operators	275	26%	
Total private	275	26%	
General total	1069,15	100%	

### FOS 2XL (1)

Table 12: Technical characteristics of the terminals of the FOS2XL project

	Terminal A	Terminal B
Draught	14,5 to 16m (in 2012)	14,5 to 16m (in 2012)
Quay length	400m (+200m of existing	700m
	quays)	
Terminal area	+/- 30 hectare	+/- 60 hectare
Capacity	300.000 TEU	500.000 TEU
Rail connection	Use of existing terminal	3 to 4 tracks of 750m to be
		constructed
Start of exploitation	Beginning 2009	Mid 2009

Source: Port of Marseilles (2005) internal documents

### FOS 2XL (2)

Table 13: Financial structure of the project of the two terminals of the FOS2XL project

Type of investment	Period	Amount (euros)
Dredging (access channel and dock)	2005, 2007-2012	61.340.000
Quays	2006-2007	72.690.000
Land reclamation and development	2006-2007	25.010.000
Hinterland and network connections	2005-2009	9.230.000
Others*	2005-2009	7.340.000
Public debate	2004	400.000
Total public sector	2004-2012	176.010.000**
Private sector		190.000.000
(superstructures) <b>Total</b>	2004-2012	366.010.000
างเลา	2004-2012	300.010.000

<sup>\*</sup> includes nature and other compensation

Source: Port of Marseilles (2005) internal documents and public debate report.


<sup>\*\*</sup> Of which: Terminal A: 68 million euros; Terminal B: 107 million euros.

# FOS 2XL (3)

Financing party	Amount (mio €)	0/0	0/0
EC	16,7	4,5%	
Region/Department	27,4	7,5%	35%
State	16,7	4,5%	
Port Authority	115,2	31,5%	65%
Total public	176,0	48%	100%
Operators	190	52%	
Total private	190	52%	
General total	366,0	100%	

#### JadeWeserPort (1)

- Construction of a greenfield container terminal, with land reclamation of 370ha on the sea, dredging and waterfront structure, rail and road connections.
- Quay length 1725m, terminal surface 120ha, logistics zone 170ha, capacity 2,7 million TEU.
- Financing parties from the public sector:
  - The state of Lower Saxony;
  - The state of Bremen.





### JadeWeserPort (2)

Financing party	Amount (mio €)	0/0
Lower Saxony	510	57%
Bremen	90	10%
Total public	600	67%
Operators	300	33%
Total private	300	33%
General total	900	100%

#### Overview

	Deurganckdok	0/0	Port 2000	0/0	FOS 2XL	0/0	JadeWeserPort	9/0
Public sector	680	42% (100%)	794	74% (100%)	176	48% (100%)	600	67% (100%)
Port Authority	140	9% (20%)	434	41% (55%)	115	32% (65%)	0	0
Region(s)	460	29% (68%)	102	10% (13%)	27	8% (16%)	600	67% (100%)
EU	0	0	47	4% (6%)	17	5% (10%)	0	0%
State	80	5% (12%)	197	19% (25%)	17	5% (10%)	0	0%
Other	0	0	14	1% (2%)	0	0	0	0%
Private sector	930	58%	275	26%	190	52%	300	33%
Total	1610	100%	1069	100%	366	100%	900	100%

#### Conclusion

- Great diversity in financing structures, as well as participation of private sector.
- Great diversity in types and technical characteristics of projects (although all container terminals).
- Generally, the port authority acts as the coordinator of the project, but the degree of financial liability seems variable.
- Although the financing structures are clear, it is not always clear where the finance comes from (types of financing as well as terms and conditions of loans).
- Interim and ex-post evaluations seem to be seldom made (only ex-post evaluation of Deurganckdok), which is strange, given long lead times for development (approx. 10 years).

#### Issues for discussion (1)

- Is there a need for more 'standardised' rules for project financing?
  - Hard law? Soft law?
  - What about project specificity (nautical conditions, construction of docks versus land reclamation for 'greenfield' terminals)?
  - Standard interim or ex-post evaluations?
- How far should the financial accountability of port authorities go?
  - Cfr. Flanders: despite a new legal framework which allows for partial financing, a clear message of 100% liability for future projects was given when the Deurganckdok was opened.

#### Issues for discussion (2)

- If port authorities are to be made 100% liable, which will be the future?
  - Public Private Partnerships?
  - Cooperation (intra and cross-border) between ports/regions?
  - Other?
- Trade-offs between financial costs of intervention and social benefits:
  - E.g. Boost of intermodality and environmental friendly transport due to scale effects;
  - E.g. More integration between and inside transport chains.